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School Acquisition Research Program under 
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• This presentation is a progress report on the 
work done so far.
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3What is PBL and How is it Being Used?
• PBL is a relatively new product support strategy 
which makes the program manager responsible for 
the total life cycle costs.
• It is different from older procurement methods 
because they focused solely on the early phases of 
development.
• PBL is structured around the performance or the 
outcomes of the contract rather than details 
specifications of the “how to do the work”.
• PBL has become the desired product support 
strategy in the DoD and it is being integrated into 
legacy programs as well as into new contracts.
Why is the Government Mentality 
Changing?
• A new product support structure is needed to 
reduce the Total Life Cycle costs.
• As a result, PBL focuses on Total Life Cycle 
Systems Management (TLCSM)
• TLCSM means the program managers focus 
on the entire life cycle, firmly linking 




• In order for PBL to effective the contractor 
has the be motivated to meet or exceed the 
performance requirements.
• To ensure effective implementation of PBL, it 
is important to provide the right incentives to 
encourage the best contractor performance.
• New incentives need to be developed and 
applied to address this shift in how 
government procurement and sustainment is 
done.
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Why are New Incentives Needed?
• PBL is significantly different from its  
predecessor programs.
• Since it focuses on the total life cycle, 
different problems are encountered so 
different solutions are required.
• The right mix of incentives means the 
contractor will be happier and, as a result, the 




• Incentives should be given based on the type 
of contract and the scope of responsibilities of 
the contract.






– Shifts risk of cost overruns to the contractor 
because they are paid a flat amount and exceed 
that amount at their own risk
• Cost-Plus
– Shifts risk of cost overruns, to a certain degree, to 
the Government because the actual costs is 
unknown so the contractor will be compensated 
based on the costs incurred. 
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Incentives Based on Contract Type
• Fixed-Price
• Fixed Price Incentive Fee (FPIF)
• Fixed Price Award Fee (FPAF)
• Cost Reimbursement (Cost-Plus)
• Cost Control Incentives
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Forms of Incentives
• Incentives come in many different forms and 




-Ex. Good review, follow on contracts etc.
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Framework for Incentive Types
• Cost-based Incentives
– Incentives based on contract costs or profit-
sharing based on performance
• Time-based Incentives
– Incentives based on duration of the contract and 
the renewals based on performance
• Scope-based Incentives
– Incentives that are based on the scope of the 
contract and expanding of the scope of the 
contract based on performance.
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Types of Cost Based Incentives
• Award Fee




Types of Time Based Incentives
• Continuation of Contract
• Contract length that allows recoup of 
investments and development new products.
• This brings to mind the S-Curve which shows 
how companies recoup investments in new 
technologies and develop new ones.  An 





• Detailed specifications shift financial risk to 
customer (government)
• Less-detailed specifications shift financial risk 
to the contractor
• Detailed specifications shift operational risk to 
the contractor
• Less-detailed specifications shift operational 
risk to the customer (government)
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Private/ Public Sector
• Profit is primary incentive for the commercial 
contractor, though long-term oriented
• Breaking even is the focus of the government 
(e.g. depot), reducing costs
• PBL seeks to change the relationship to 
incorporate more private sector incentives 
into the public sector (FAR part 12)
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Short-term vs. Long-term
• Profits should meet or exceed the 
expectations of the investor, otherwise stock 
prices will fall weakening the contractor’s 
ability to borrow (higher interest rates). 
• Short-terms profits are the focus of the 
speculative investor driving quarterly 
performance measures and stock valuation.
• Long-term investors seek high long-term 
profits. Short-term fluctuations are tolerated.
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Short-term vs. Long-term (continued)
• Short-term profits are crucial to maintaining 
timely cash flow.
• Private industry is more likely to have shorter 
product lifecycles.
• Long-term profits are necessary to justify 
capital expenditures.
• Lengthy product lifecycles are typical in 




• Requires reform of existing contract vehicles
• Contractors must be proactive in creating 
incentives (more likely to occur at 
subcontracting level where dollar thresholds 
are lower, causing less government scrutiny)
• Product spin-offs (e.g. Tactical Operations 
Center Intercommunications Network)
• Enhanced reputation 
• Creative and responsible cost accounting
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Conclusions
• PBL is the result of an evolutionary process
• PBL articulates basic strategy for contract 
performance
• Improved technology has enabled more 
comprehensive and accurate performance 
measurement (metrics)
• Contract type dictates performance
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Conclusions (continued)
• Creative Incentives are risky and require 
reform of existing contract guidelines (FAR, 
DFARS, TINA)
• Contractual type should reflect applicable 
point in product lifecycle
• PBL deployment requires customer 
(government) to relinquish control
• Reform of Government culture is crucial
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Conclusions (continued)
• Contractors prefer long-term contracts to 
recoup capital investment
• The customer (government) desires capital 
investment from the contractor, but long-term 
contracts increase customer risk 
• Improved metrics resulting from 
improvements in technology will enable PBL
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Conclusions (continued)
• More investigation, analysis, and modeling. 
Interviews, statistical analysis, and scientific 
method should be applied to determine PBL 
effectiveness and behavioral change. 
• We are continuing to work on this and can 
use your inputs, ideas, and support.
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Thank you for Listening
Questions?
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